Post by amirmukaddas on Mar 12, 2024 22:58:16 GMT -5
How many times have you searched for something on Google without knowing its name? Could you make Google understand that you are interested in Sicilian cassata without writing either cassata or Siciliana on Google? I have a fixed idea in my mind: since Google has gradually hidden the possibility of seeing users' precise searches, no one can get it out of my head that enormous power is hidden in those queries. Knowing "the exact words" that people use to search on Google would be a bit like finding yourself in Mel Gibson's shoes in What women want , that film in which the protagonist was able to "hear" the true thoughts of women. Too much grace in short.
Phenomenology of web search If it is true that there are various "dry" money keys, i.e. keywords that are often expressed as queries in "exact" form by users, it is equally true that many searches are "unusual" and until some time ago, i.e. in the era pre hummingbird, they would not have easily led to the desired result. Today it is possible to make Google understand what we are looking for without naming it, but simply by querying Google as if we were playing Trivial Denmark Telegram Number Data Pursuit . Sure, he can be wrong, but then again, we human beings also talk and don't understand each other. Round thing with candied fruit I swear that there are those who search for Sicilian cassata like this, and the strangest thing is that Google actually responds with the cassata recipe! Here we are not thinking so much about the semantic field or the ontology that specifies and defines the word "cassata", that is, we do so only in part with the word candied fruit, but that "round thing" is absolutely fantastic, because it is the way in which a 5 year old child would call it a cassata if he saw it for the first time.
What are lateral ontologies? They are simplifications of reality. Alternative definitional exercises , which by their nature could not easily fit into a real ontology. For example, if we assume that still water, mineral water, ionized water and sparkling water specify the object of knowledge "water" constituting its ontology, we could consider an alternative system of objects, an improper, precisely "lateral" ontology, which arises to related objects, linguistic forms such as "wet thing, humid thing, non-alcoholic transparent liquid substance, tasteless and colorless liquid, liquid essential to life" etc. In essence: If an ontology is a specification of a conceptualization (Gruber, T. 1993), a lateral ontology must be the definition of a conceptualization.
Phenomenology of web search If it is true that there are various "dry" money keys, i.e. keywords that are often expressed as queries in "exact" form by users, it is equally true that many searches are "unusual" and until some time ago, i.e. in the era pre hummingbird, they would not have easily led to the desired result. Today it is possible to make Google understand what we are looking for without naming it, but simply by querying Google as if we were playing Trivial Denmark Telegram Number Data Pursuit . Sure, he can be wrong, but then again, we human beings also talk and don't understand each other. Round thing with candied fruit I swear that there are those who search for Sicilian cassata like this, and the strangest thing is that Google actually responds with the cassata recipe! Here we are not thinking so much about the semantic field or the ontology that specifies and defines the word "cassata", that is, we do so only in part with the word candied fruit, but that "round thing" is absolutely fantastic, because it is the way in which a 5 year old child would call it a cassata if he saw it for the first time.
What are lateral ontologies? They are simplifications of reality. Alternative definitional exercises , which by their nature could not easily fit into a real ontology. For example, if we assume that still water, mineral water, ionized water and sparkling water specify the object of knowledge "water" constituting its ontology, we could consider an alternative system of objects, an improper, precisely "lateral" ontology, which arises to related objects, linguistic forms such as "wet thing, humid thing, non-alcoholic transparent liquid substance, tasteless and colorless liquid, liquid essential to life" etc. In essence: If an ontology is a specification of a conceptualization (Gruber, T. 1993), a lateral ontology must be the definition of a conceptualization.